... they just fade away

To the extent I've written about the politics of countries other than the U.S., it has been about (reasonably) well-functioning democracies, such as Britain and Germany. I have not, yet at least, blogged about such nasty subjects as military coups and dictatorships.

However, I find it noteworthy that President Pervez Musharraf of Pakistan has announced his intention to resign. He seized power in a military coup in 1999, when he was Army chief of staff. Since then, there has been a gradual process of restoring democracy to Pakistan. On paper, this resignation should complete that process, but the democracy is still very shaky. The main threat is that of an Islamist revolution, similar to that which took power in Iran in 1979.

In America, we have never had a serious threat of military coup. The Constitution, in Article II, Section 2, clause 1, provides that "the President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States".

Some Americans have raised concerns about military officers' influence over political decision-making. Those concerns were perhaps most eloquently stated by President Dwight Eisenhower on January 17, 1961. Just last week, Andrew Sullivan quoted Eisenhower's remarks about the military-industrial complex, as part of Sullivan's argument that the U.S. response to the war between Russia and Georgia has been overly militaristic.

But it seems to me that such concerns are a far cry from any serious doubts about the concept of civilian control of the military.

Two events from American history are commonly cited as reinforcing that concept. The first predated the Constitution, and the second occurred more than a century-and-a-half later.

The first such event happened on December 23, 1783, when George Washington resigned his commission as the U.S. military commander, at a meeting of Congress at Annapolis, Maryland. That was shortly after the war to establish independence from Britain had been successfully concluded via the Treaty of Paris. The importance placed on that action is exemplified by the placement in the Capitol Rotunda of a painting that commemorates the event.

The widely-accepted interpretation of Washington's resignation is that he was voluntarily forgoing an opportunity to transform his military position into political power. This is based on the idea that he could have established himself as a dictator and/or monarch over the new country. Scott Johnson wrote along those lines in Power Line, near the anniversary of the event in 2007.

Washington is seen as nearly unique in world history in showing such self-restraint. The usual comparison is to the Roman general Cincinnatus, who left his farm during the fifth century B.C.E. to lead the Roman military against their enemies, the Aequians. Once victory was attained, he gave up power, and returned to his farm.

I'm a bit skeptical about the Washington story in the sense that, in light of all the difficulties he had in holding the army together during the 1775-83 war, it's difficult to see that army as a force sufficiently strong to assert ultimate power. But I suppose that the U.S. government as it then existed, under the weak Articles of Confederation, would not have been difficult to overthrow. Also, it may have been Washington's charisma, as much as the brute force of his army, that could have secured his power.

Be that as it may, Washington, following Cincinnatus' example, returned to his farm. He did subsequently agree to be called back to serve as the first president under the Constitution, from 1789 to 1797. But he again voluntarily relinquished power, when he declined to seek a third term in 1796.

As I've noted in earlier posts, such was Washington's moral authority that his retirement from the presidency functioned as an informal two-term limit for nearly 150 years. Only after one of his successors, Franklin Roosevelt, broke the tradition, did Congress and the states find it necessary to write the two-term limit into the Constitution.

The second event that reinforced the concept of civilian control of the military was President Harry Truman's firing of General Douglas MacArthur, on April 11, 1951.

MacArthur, who had been commander of the American occupation forces in Japan following that country's surrender in August 1945, expanded his role into Korea, after the June 1950 invasion of South Korea. He publicly stated his disagreements with Truman's war policy, so Truman found it necessary to reinforce the concept that military leaders cannot be insubordinate to their civilian commander.

I think it's very difficult for those of us of later generations to fully understand the impact of that action. As I've noted elsewhere, Truman has become a folk hero to Americans who are too young to remember his presidency. During his presidency, however, his poll ratings plunged to depths lower than any experienced by George W. Bush and other unpopular presidents, especially during low points in the Korean War.

In addition to that, MacArthur has often been portrayed in recent times as a buffoonish publicity-hound, whose military abilities have been exaggerated. In 1951, however, he enjoyed enormous popularity, as a hero both of World War II, and of early successes in the Korean War, starting with the landing at Inchon.

So, Truman's dismissal of MacArthur met enormous criticism in Congress and in the country. An immediate emotional reaction called for Truman's impeachment. But, as emotions cooled, there was no serious movement to undermine civilian control of the military. Truman's action was seen as wrong-headed, but not as being outside of the scope of the powers of the presidency.